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Abstract
Self-evaluations play an important role in various fields of study, specifically in research on
metacognition and self-concept. Although the assumption that self-evaluations as known
from metacognitive monitoring and academic self-concept are related has received wide
agreement, the nature of such a relationship has only rarely been investigated. In the current
study, the individual-differences approach that has occasionally addressed this association
is discussed and extended twofold. For one, a novel way to compare metacognition and
self-concept is presented by computing a self-concept bias—analogous to metacognition
research. For another, the study targeted a younger population, namely first-grade children.
In line with previous studies, the results confirmed a weak relation between metacognitive
monitoring and academic self-concept when relating the two constructs at the absolute level
of confidence. However, relating the constructs by means of the respective biases revealed
a more substantial association. Thus, while previous studies have assumed the common
thread between metacognition and self-concept to be best explained by a general confi-
dence trait, the present study suggests the accuracy of self-evaluations to be at stake
instead. Hence, by introducing a method to quantify a bias in self-concept, the current study
proposes a new and promising way to compare and relate the constructs of metacognition
and self-concept.
Introduction
There are several areas of research dealing with an individual’s self-evaluation. For instance,
self-evaluations play an essential role in research on metacognition and self-concept. However,
stemming from independent research traditions, metacognition and self-concept have always
been considered to reflect distinct constructs. Accordingly, they have neither been investigated
thoroughly from a joint perspective nor fundamentally linked on a theoretical basis. The pres-
ent work follows up on one of the few fields of study that have occasionally addressed the rela-
tionship between metacognition and self-concept, namely the individual-differences approach
that assumes a general confidence trait in individuals. In the following paragraphs, the existing
literature is discussed and extended in two different ways. For one, the current study aims to
advance the state of research by suggesting a novel and promising way to compare the con-
structs of metacognition and self-concept. For another, previous research is expanded to
PLOS ONE







Citation: Dapp LC, Roebers CM (2021)
Metacognition and self-concept: Elaborating on a
construct relation in first-grade children. PLoS ONE
16(4): e0250845. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.
pone.0250845
Editor: Trinidad Garcia, University of Oviedo,
SPAIN
Received: August 28, 2020
Accepted: April 14, 2021
Published: April 28, 2021
Copyright: © 2021 Dapp, Roebers. This is an open
access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author and source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: All relevant data for
the manuscript are submitted within the
Supporting information files.
Funding: The authors received no specific funding
for this work.
Competing interests: The authors have declared
that no competing interests exist.
younger participants by targeting first-grade children. Thus, while prior studies primarily
focused on adults, the present study is exploring the early roots of the relationship between
metacognition and self-concept.
Broadly defined, metacognition refers to an individuals’ knowledge about cognition and
any cognitive activity that regulates cognitive processes [1]. The regulation of cognition con-
sists of monitoring and control processes, whereby monitoring is defined as the ability to sur-
veil, check, and appraise the quality of one’s own cognitive processes in the course of doing it
[2,3]. Confidence judgments—which are in the focus of the present study—constitute an inte-
gral part of metacognitive monitoring as they express a person’s belief in the accuracy of a
given answer shortly after responding to an item [2]. Hence, confidence judgments reflect self-
appraisals related to performance in a specific item (or set of items) of a cognitive task [4].
Self-concept, on the other hand, refers to the knowledge and perception a person has about
him- or herself, including self-perceived competence as well as its appraisal in various domains
[5,6]. Self-concept is known to be domain-specific, that is, self-concept consists of various sub-
domains such as social, physical, and academic self-concept [7]. The latter is often subdivided
into mathematical and verbal self-concept. In contrast to confidence judgments that usually
are—at least theoretically—restricted to the self-perceived performance in one specific item or
task, self-concept ratings are based on the self-perceived performance in an entire domain, tar-
geting skills and performance in a broad variety of domain-relevant tasks. Moreover, while
confidence judgments directly follow the act of cognitive performance (i.e., providing the
answer), self-concept ratings are given in retrospect to a prolonged period of (cognitive) per-
formance. Hence, self-concept can be seen as the broader, overarching, longer-lasting, and
probably more abstract construct of self-evaluation [4].
Given the fact that both confidence judgments and academic self-concept reflect the
appraisal of one’s own cognitive performance, non-trivial correlations between these con-
structs have been assumed [4]. However, so far, only little is known about the nature of the
relationship between the two constructs [8]. One area of research that has occasionally
addressed the relation between metacognitive monitoring and self-concept hails from the indi-
vidual-differences approach within the metacognition research and has interconnected the
two constructs in search of factors explaining overconfidence, a response pattern that is
observed in many individuals and particularly pronounced in children. The theoretical back-
ground as well as the most relevant findings that emerged from this approach are discussed in
the following paragraphs.
Since both confidence judgments and self-concept reflect beliefs about one’s own ability or
performance, it is not surprising that (similar) deviations from objective performance have
been expected to manifest themselves in either research domain. Indeed, a trend toward over-
confidence is consistently reported in research from both areas [9–12]. That is, although confi-
dence judgments and self-concept typically are related to performance up to some extent,
many individuals tend to have an overoptimistically high sense of how well they are doing.
However, while such persistent overconfidence has been of interest in both fields of research,
it is—to the best of our knowledge—only in the domain of metacognition that “calibration”
has extensively been studied. Within so-called calibration studies, confidence ratings are con-
sidered in relation to the objective performance in the respective cognitive test to determine
how accurate one’s confidence ratings are. In consequence of this high interest in metacogni-
tion accuracy, various measures have been established to quantify the realism in confidence
ratings [13, for a review]. In the present study, the focus will be on two common measures
accounting for monitoring accuracy, namely resolution and bias. Resolution refers to a dis-
crimination measure that reflects the relative accuracy in confidence judgments. The bias,
in contrast, reflects the absolute accuracy in confidence judgments, and thus, allows for
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determining the degree of over- or underconfidence, respectively [14,15]. Both resolution and
bias have been shown to be well suitable indicators for monitoring accuracy in children
[16,17].
Calibration research clearly demonstrates systematic differences between confidence rat-
ings and the accuracy of given answers, indicating an overall bias towards overconfidence in
most individuals [10,18]. Certainly, self-perceptions are not equally biased in all individuals,
and there is strong evidence for consistent individual differences with respect to the realism
in confidence ratings. That is, some individuals are systematically more overconfident than
others, and they tend to be very consistent in their overall belief of how well they are doing
[10,19–21]. Hence, individuals seem to have an overall sense of self-confidence that is reliable,
but not very accurate [10].
As seen from the individual-differences approach, such miscalibration—in most cases over-
confidence—is attributed to sources from within the individual [22]. That is, bias in confi-
dence judgments may be a result of a disposition of individuals to appraise their own cognitive
work in a certain way [23,24]. Hence, the cause for miscalibration is assumed to lie in a system-
atic tendency of individuals to express a consistent confidence level that is irrespective of their
performance [19,25].
In order to explain individual differences within the realism of confidence judgments,
researchers have compared (absolute levels of, i.e., noncalibrated) confidence ratings from a
broad range of cognitive tests. Indeed—while the correlations between confidence judgments
and performance from the same test tend to be significant, indicating substantial realism in
confidence ratings [26, for a review]—a considerable amount of research has shown confi-
dence judgments from a broad battery of generic cognitive tests to be consistently intercorre-
lated as well [23,24,27]. These intercorrelations are high enough to assume a broad and robust
self-confidence factor reflecting the habitual way in which individuals appraise the accuracy of
their cognitive performance. Given the high stability of confidence judgments, the self-confi-
dence factor has been supposed to feature the properties of a psychological trait, and hence, is
often named “confidence trait” [8,28]. There is ample evidence for a general self-confidence
trait in adults [4,19,20,23,24,27–29] as well as in children as young as 9 to 12 years [8,30,31].
However, evidence is pending with regard to younger children.
While there is marked evidence for a general self-confidence trait, almost nothing is known
about the nature of this trait [32]. If, as seen from the individual-differences approach, self-
confidence denotes a psychological trait, then this implies that self-confidence arises from sta-
ble person-driven factors in confidence ratings [24,33,34]. Since self-concept—the broad con-
struct of self-evaluation—is known to be stable and sometimes considered a personality
characteristic [32,35], a relationship between self-confidence and some well-established areas
of self-concept has been assumed [4,27]. More precisely, it has been proposed that self-concept
facets that are relevant in cognitive test-taking situations—e.g., the academic self-concept and
its sub-facets (i.e., mathematical and verbal self-concept) as well as the memory and the rea-
soning self-concept—might be related to confidence scores [27,32]. However, the assumed
relationship between self-confidence and self-concept has only been studied in a few studies,
leaving one with limited empirical support [8,27].
In adults, the general academic self-concept as well as the problem-solving self-concept
have been shown to be related to a broad self-confidence trait in a study by Kröner and Bier-
mann [32]. Foremost, Stankov and Crawford [4] reported low, but significant domain-specific
correlations between confidence ratings as obtained by the Raven’s Progressive Matrices as
well as a vocabulary test with mathematical and verbal self-concept, respectively. Finally, Niet-
feld and Schraw [36] showed general mathematical self-efficacy—a proxy for mathematical
self-concept—to be related to participants’ self-confidence in a mathematical probability test.
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With respect to younger participants, Stankov and colleagues [28] revealed domain-specific
associations between confidence and self-concept in 15-year-olds. That is, the English self-con-
cept was related to confidence judgments in an English test, whereas the mathematical self-
concept was related to confidence judgments in a mathematics test. Similarly, Efklides and
Tsiora [37] found 10- and 11-year-old children’s mathematical self-concept to be related to
estimates of solution correctness given after solving mathematical problems. Thereby, the esti-
mates of solution correctness were mainly influenced by the self-concept and, to a lesser
degree, by performance, a finding supporting the assumption of confidence ratings being
influenced by (or “biased towards”) the self-concept. Finally, a study by Kleitman and Gibson
[30] showed the beliefs about one’s own memory and reasoning abilities as well as academic
self-efficacy to be related to a broad self-confidence trait in 12-year-olds.
Although these results indicate a weak, yet significant, positive association between meta-
cognitive self-confidence and various measures of self-concept in adults as well as in children,
it is important to note that all of them rely on the premise that the measures of self-confidence
are composed of absolute levels of confidence, that is, that metacognitive self-confidence scores
are obtained by averaging the “raw” confidence judgments. Hence, the positive association
between self-confidence and self-concept may not be generalizable to any form of calibrated,
i.e., performance adjusted confidence judgments—which, as stated above, constitute a vital
part of metacognition research.
Indeed, some of the studies clearly show the finding of a positive association between self-
confidence and self-concept to be limited to the condition where self-confidence is treated on
the absolute level, however, that the relationship does not persist when monitoring accuracy is
taken into account. For example, in the studies by Nietfeld and Schraw [36] as well as Stankov
and Crawford [4], mathematical self-concept was shown to be related to the absolute level of
confidence scores, but not to the bias scores. Similarly, verbal self-concept was related to the
absolute level of confidence in a vocabulary test, however, once controlling for performance,
the relation became insignificant. Taken together, the self-confidence trait seems to be moder-
ately related to various facets of academic self-concept, however, only as long as self-confi-
dence is understood as the absolute level of confidence, i.e., raw confidence judgments. When
performance is taken into account—that is, when confidence judgments are calibrated—self-
confidence seems to have only little in common with self-concept.
Nonetheless, the realism of individuals’ self-evaluation is of particular interest in both
research fields, and the accuracy of confidence judgments literally constitutes a key component
in the metacognition research. Confidence ratings per se cannot be regarded as reflecting
more accurate confidence judgments. To the contrary, they are akin to expressions of beliefs
and, as such, similar to statements known from attitudes scales [4], a fact that may also explain
the empirical closeness to self-concept described above. However, having a realistic confidence
may constitute a more desirable goal than high certainty per se [38], since accurate self-moni-
toring is recognized as an essential component for successful learning [18]. Moreover, confi-
dence judgments are not simply the reproduction of a personal disposition of how confident
one is about his or her cognitive performance. Rather, they result from an interplay of such
general confidence, individual competences, and the actual performance in the applied test
[25,32,39]. Hence, it seems purposive to consider the realism in self-evaluations when investi-
gating metacognition—be it as a trait per se or in relation to other constructs.
Although there is no relation between self-confidence and self-concept when confidence
ratings are calibrated, it may be premature to conclude that the constructs reflect distinct cog-
nitive processes. When confidence judgments are considered in relation to a measure of per-
formance, but self-concept is not, the two constructs are addressed from different perspectives.
In search of the common thread between monitoring and self-concept, however, one should
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treat the constructs within a unified approach and analyze them as being on a par. Comparing
the constructs by relying on absolute levels of self-ratings in both is one way to do so. However,
since both monitoring as well as self-concept tend to be positively biased, yet influenced by
one’s performance, skills, and achievement, robust insights into the true relationship between
metacognition and self-concept may only be obtained by relying on performance-adjusted
measures derived from both constructs.
The present study
The purpose of the current study was to compare children’s self-evaluations in monitoring
and academic self-concept by relying on the absolute levels of self-ratings as well as the respec-
tive bias scores while building on the existing literature that is, however, dominated by adult
data. One of the main objectives was to determine whether the common thread between meta-
cognition and self-concept truly lies in the absolute levels of an individual’s self-evaluation—as
assumed in previous studies—or rather in a common disposition towards overconfidence. The
former would imply that metacognition and self-concept share an individual’s (trait-like) ten-
dency towards a certain level of self-confidence. The latter, in contrast, would suppose the
common aspect to be inherent in the ability to realistically evaluate one’s own cognitive work.
To examine the specific nature of the constructs’ overlap, each construct’s absolute level of
confidence and bias, respectively, were contrasted. While various measures have been devel-
oped to specify the realism in metacognitive monitoring, the accuracy of self-evaluations has
not been directly considered in measures of self-concept. By “calibrating” self-concept similar
to how it is done with confidence judgments in the metacognition research, the present work
presents a novel way to quantify overconfidence in the form of a bias for self-concept. This
procedure allows to compare the two constructs on a so far unexplored level, and hence, may
provide a deeper understanding of the relationship between metacognition and self-concept.
With respect to the second objective, namely, to expand previous research to younger par-
ticipants, the present study investigated first-grade children—an age group where self-evalua-
tions related to scholastic performance become highly relevant. In accordance with findings
from adult studies, we expected children’s metacognition and self-concept to share a tendency
towards a certain level of absolute self-appraisal. Since children tend to be more overconfident
than adults, and a process of construct differentiation over the course of development has been
reported for other constructs [16], the relation between metacognition and self-concept—with
respect to absolute levels—may turn out to be closer in children than in adults. Nevertheless,
we expected the constructs’ overlap to be even stronger when relating the constructs by means
of the accuracy in monitoring and self-concept, respectively. Hence, the current study scruti-
nizes if a substantial amount of shared processes among metacognition and self-concept in
terms of children’s ability to realistically evaluate their own cognitive work can be disclosed.
Materials and methods
Procedure
Data came from a study of Swiss first-grade children. The dataset comprised measures of aca-
demic achievement (mathematics and literacy), academic self-concept (mathematical and
verbal), and metacognitive monitoring (confidence judgments) collected by trained experi-
menters in children’s schools. While self-concept and monitoring were assessed individually,
the testing of academic achievement was done in a class setting. Monitoring was assessed in
the context of a learning task and administered on laptops; self-concept and achievement
tests were administered in paper-pencil form. The testing session took about 50 minutes per
child. The study had been approved by the Faculty of Humanities’ Ethics Committee at the
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University of Bern, Switzerland, and was realized in accordance with the Declaration of Hel-
sinki. Parents gave written informed consent for their children to participate in the study.
Participants
One hundred and fifty-five children (71 girls, 84 boys) from the German-speaking part of Swit-
zerland participated in the study. At the time of data collection, children attended first grade
and had a mean age of 7 years and 6 months (SD = 4.19 months).
Measures
Academic achievement. Academic achievement in mathematics and literacy was assessed
using age-appropriate and standardized tests. Three scores each were collected for mathemat-
ics and literacy.
Mathematical achievement. Mathematical achievement was assessed by three subtests of the
“Heidelberger Rechentest” (HRT) [40], a standardized and curriculum-based test of mathe-
matical achievement. These subtests consisted of magnitude comparison, continuation of
numerical sequences, and addition and subtraction problems (Cronbach’s α = .80). The
reported test-retest reliabilities of the HRT range from r = .87 to .93.
Literacy achievement. Literacy achievement was assessed by three standardized, curricu-
lum-based tests measuring basic reading and spelling skills. Reading comprehension was
assessed using the “Salzburger Lese Screening” (SLS) [41] where children had to judge sen-
tences with respect to their meaningfulness. Speed of reading was assessed using the “Würzbur-
ger Leise Lese Probe” (WLLP) [42] where children had to read a word and identify the
matching picture as fast as possible. Spelling was assessed by the Hamburger Schreib-Probe
(HSP) [43] where children had to write the names of 22 illustrated objects as well as one com-
plete sentence. Cronbach’s α for the three tests accounted for .85. The reported parallel-form
reliabilities for the three tests range from r = .82 to .98.
Metacognitive monitoring. Metacognitive monitoring was assessed in the context of a
paired associate learning task [44] where children had to learn the meaning of Japanese
symbols, so-called Kanjis. The task consisted of two sequenced sets of 8 Kanjis each. Both
sequences were administered in the same order. First, children had to learn the meaning of
the Kanjis in a fixed-length encoding phase. Therefore, each Kanji was presented for four
seconds together with a color picture showing its meaning. Each trial was preceded by a fix-
ation task where a cross, the attractor, was displayed in the center of the screen for the dura-
tion of one second. After the encoding phase, children completed a memory retrieval test
where each Kanji was presented in combination with four of the pictures presented before.
Children had to select the picture they thought to correspond with the target Kanji. Finally,
children were asked how confident they were about their answers by providing confidence
judgments for each Kanji on a 5-point Likert-like scale depicted by smiley faces. This smiley
scale, introduced to the children before the testing, consisted of five smileys with different
smile expressions, ranging from happy to sad. The corresponding verbal labels were very
sure, sure, neither sure nor unsure, unsure, and very unsure. For the analyses, the smileys
were numbered from zero (very unsure) to four (very sure). To ensure that children under-
stood the smiley scale, the instruction included a story about a child that had to guess in
which of six boxes a ball was hidden. Children understood the use of the smiley scale quickly
and solved the three practice questions with ease. For the analyses, measures of absolute
level of confidence judgments, monitoring resolution, and bias in confidence judgments
were applied.
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Absolute level of confidence judgments. As a measure for the absolute level of confidence
judgments, the mean of all confidence judgments was used (Cronbach’s α = .85). The absolute
level of confidence judgments could range from 0 (low confidence) to 4 (high confidence).
Monitoring resolution. To determine the relative accuracy in monitoring, a discrimination
score was computed by subtracting the mean confidence judgment for incorrect trials from
the mean confidence judgment for correct trials [14,45–47]. Note that resolution could only
be computed for children with at least one error in the memory retrieval test (i.e., 77% of the
sample). Monitoring resolution could range from -4 (poor discrimination) to +4 (perfect
discrimination).
Monitoring bias. The monitoring bias was implemented to determine the absolute monitor-
ing accuracy in terms of over- and underconfidence in confidence judgments relative to per-
formance [15,48]. The bias was specified by the absolute discrepancy between the memory
retrieval performance (correct or incorrect recognition of the Kanji) and the respective confi-
dence judgment. In case of correct recognition, the confidence judgment “very sure”, consti-
tuting the most appropriate confidence judgment, resulted in a discrepancy of zero; the
confidence judgment “sure” in a negative discrepancy of -1, indicating underestimation of per-
formance; the confidence judgment “neither sure nor unsure” in a discrepancy of -2; the confi-
dence judgment “unsure” in a discrepancy of -3; and the confidence judgment “very unsure”
in a discrepancy of -4. In case of incorrect recognition, in contrast, the confidence judgment
“very unsure” constituted the most appropriate confidence judgment and resulted in a discrep-
ancy of zero; the confidence judgment “unsure” in a positive discrepancy of +1; the confidence
judgment “neither sure nor unsure” in a discrepancy of +2; the confidence judgment “sure” in
a discrepancy of +3; and the confidence judgment “very sure” in a discrepancy of +4. For every
participant, the mean discrepancy across the 16 items was used as an index of monitoring bias.
The monitoring bias could range from a performance underestimation of -4 to a performance
overestimation of +4, with a score around zero being indicative of accurate self-evaluations.
Self-concept. Academic self-concept (mathematical and verbal self-concept; three items
each) was assessed by the Pictorial Self-Concept of Attainment Scale (PSCAS) [49,50]. Every
item of the PSCAS was designed as a vertical row of 25 stickmen, that is, a realistic size of a
child’s class [51]. For every item, children were told that the uppermost stickman represented
the best performing and the lowermost stickman the poorest performing child in class in the
ability captured by the respective item. The children were instructed to select the stickman that
best represented their relative position in class. To ensure that children understood the task
correctly, children had to complete a mock item about their relative body height by imaging
that their classmates had to line up according to their body height. Children understood the
logic and the use of the scale easily. For the analyses, measures of absolute level and bias in aca-
demic self-concept were used.
Absolute level of self-concept. The absolute level of academic self-concept was computed as
the mean of absolute mathematical and verbal self-concept (Cronbach’s α = .79 for all six
items). The absolute level of self-concept could range from 1 (low confidence) to 25 (high
confidence).
Self-concept bias. The bias in academic self-concept was determined by the discrepancy
between the domain-specific self-concept (i.e., mathematical and verbal self-concept, respec-
tively) and the academic achievement score in the respective domain. Therefore, the six
measures of academic achievement were rescaled to a 25-point scale each, rendering the
achievement measures to an equivalent scale length as the six self-concept scales, and hence,
providing objective measures of performance to validate the self-concept. Analogously to
the procedure described to calculate the monitoring bias, discrepancies between academic
achievement and self-concept ratings were computed and then averaged across self-concept
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domains. The self-concept bias score could range from an underestimation of -24 to an overes-




Descriptive statistics for the various measures of confidence judgments and self-concept are
shown in Table 1 (histograms are provided in S2). The mean accuracy of recall in the Kanji-
task was 79% (SD = .20), corresponding to approximately 13 correctly remembered items on
average. Academic achievement—rescaled to a 25-point scale as noted above—accounted for a
mean score of M = 12.13 (SD = 3.56). The correlation between recall accuracy and academic
achievement was r = .40 (p< .001). All correlations are reported in S1 Table.
Realism, confidence, and overconfidence
Analyses revealed that children had achieved the ability to objectively evaluate their perfor-
mance—at least to a fundamental degree. That is, children’s confidence judgments were signif-
icantly correlated with their performance in the Kanji task (r = .241, p< .05). Similarly, self-
concept was significantly related to the academic achievement in the respective domain (r =
.343, p< .001 for the mathematical domain; r = .385, p< .001 for the verbal domain).
Together, these results indicate some early realism in children’s self-evaluation.
At the same time, results revealed a significant tendency towards overconfidence. Both the
absolute level of confidence judgments and the absolute level of academic self-concept were
significantly above the respective scale midpoint; t(154) = 22.692, p< .001 for confidence
judgments; t(154) = 20.904, p< .001 for self-concept. Similarly, monitoring resolution was
clearly below the value indicating perfect relative monitoring accuracy. A one-sample T-test
confirmed that children’s monitoring resolution significantly differed from perfect monitoring
resolution; t(119) = -46.496, p< .001. Finally, both the bias in monitoring and the bias in self-
concept were above zero, suggesting a tendency towards overconfidence in children’s moni-
toring and self-concept. A series of one-sample T-tests against the value of perfect absolute
accuracy confirmed overly optimistic self-evaluations in both constructs; t(154) = 3.125, p<
.05 for confidence judgments; t(154) = 22.265, p< .001 for self-concept.
To compare the amount of confidence and overconfidence in monitoring and self-concept,
respectively, the dissimilar scale ranges of confidence judgment and self-concept measures
were taken into account by rescaling the bias and the absolute level of confidence judgments to
an equal scale length as the respective self-concept measures. A paired sample T-test showed
that the absolute level of confidence judgments and the absolute level of self-concept did not
differ significantly; t(154) = -1.885, p = .061. In contrast, when comparing monitoring and
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
M SD Min Max
Confidence judgments
Absolute level of confidence judgments 3.23 .68 1.19 4.00
Monitoring resolution -0.13 .97 -3.34 3.87
Monitoring bias 0.20 .79 -1.37 2.69
Academic self-concept
Absolute level of self-concept 19.63 3.95 5.17 25.00
Self-concept bias 7.50 4.19 -2.31 20.45
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0250845.t001
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self-concept bias, a paired sample T-test showed the bias in self-concept to be significantly
higher than the bias in monitoring; t(154) = 15.949, p< .001. Thus, while the absolute level of
confidence seems to manifest itself on a similar level, overconfidence seems to be immanent in
both constructs, yet more pronounced in self-concept.
Three types of relation between monitoring and self-concept
To determine the nature of the relations between various measures of monitoring and self-
concept, a set of three bivariate correlations was computed. First, monitoring resolution and
the absolute level of self-concept, i.e., the state-of-the-art measures in each respective research
area, were related. As shown in Fig 1A, resolution and absolute level of self-concept were posi-
tively, yet not significantly related to each other. This finding supports the assumption that
metacognitive monitoring—in terms of monitoring resolution—and self-concept constitute
distinct constructs.
Next, the absolute level of confidence judgments and the absolute level of academic self-
concept—two measures reflecting an individual’s subjective perception of success in a specific
task or domain, irrespective of the actual performance—were related. As shown in Fig 1B,
these absolute levels of self-evaluation were significantly and positively related to each other
with a small effect size [52]. Thus, individuals reporting high confidence judgments also tend
to have a high academic self-concept.
Fig 1. Relations between various measures of confidence judgments and self-concept. A = Relation between
monitoring resolution and absolute level of academic self-concept; B = Relation between absolute level of confidence
judgments and absolute level of academic self-concept; C = Relation between monitoring bias and academic self-
concept bias; �� = p< .01; ��� = p< .001.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0250845.g001
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Finally, the bias in confidence judgments and the bias in academic self-concept were
related. Fig 1C displays that these two biases significantly—and even stronger than the absolute
levels of self-evaluation—correlated with each other. That is, persons with a smaller bias in
their confidence judgments also have a smaller bias in their self-concept.
Discussion
The present study sought to elaborate on the connection between metacognition and self-con-
cept, two constructs that are based on an individual’s self-evaluation. Although the assumption
of a common thread between metacognition and self-concept—such as a common tendency
towards biased self-appraisals or a shared cognitive process of self-evaluation—has received
wide support on a rather tentative basis, previous research has only sporadically investigated
such a relation. Especially with children, the nature of the assumed relationship is far from
being fully understood. Moreover, the few studies that aimed at figuring out a common dispo-
sition of self-evaluation in metacognition and self-concept primarily focused on absolute levels
of self-confidence, and, thereby, largely disregarded the influence of performance. However,
since performance, such as monitoring recall accuracy or domain-specific ability, respectively,
is expected to be reflected in confidence judgments and self-concept, the present study’s pur-
pose was to extend prior findings by incorporating measures of performance while empirically
comparing the constructs of metacognition and self-concept in first-grade children.
Regarding the accuracy of children’s self-evaluations, results showed that children were
overconfident in both monitoring and academic self-concept, whereby the bias in self-concept
was even more pronounced than the bias in monitoring. Nevertheless, the intercorrelations
between the same-test scores revealed the measures of self-evaluation to be significantly related
to the measures of performance as well. That is, confidence judgments were significantly
related to the recall accuracy in the Kanji task, whereas the mathematical and verbal self-con-
cept were significantly related to the achievement in mathematics and literacy, respectively.
Thus, it can be concluded that children’s subjective self-appraisals do reflect their objective
performance, however, only up to a certain degree, since there was a clear tendency towards
overconfidence. Hence, in disentangling the overlap between metacognition and self-concept,
it seemed purposive to consider the realism in self-evaluations as well.
In addressing the current study’s primary objective, namely to determine whether the com-
mon thread between metacognition and self-concept truly lies in the absolute level of self-eval-
uations or in a shared ability to provide realistic self-appraisals, three bivariate correlations
designed to capture the relation between different measures of self-evaluation were computed.
First, the constructs were related by relying on measures reflecting the common state-of-the-
art standard in the respective research area, namely relative monitoring accuracy (i.e., resolu-
tion) for confidence judgments and the absolute level of self-concept ratings. Next, leaving the
self-concept measure unchanged, confidence judgments were considered the absolute level of
confidence as well. This approach is consistent with the procedure observed in studies that
investigate the general confidence trait. Finally, two analogous measures of absolute accuracy
were related, that is, the bias in confidence judgments and the bias in self-concept.
Overall, the results indicate that the relation between children’s metacognitive monitoring
and self-concept varies depending on what measures are used in the analyses. When measures
of monitoring confidence and self-concept are computed in a way that reflects the state-of-
the-art in the respective field of research—that is, when confidence judgments are reflected by
a calibration score such as resolution and self-concept by a score of absolute level of self-evalu-
ation—monitoring and self-concept are only very weakly related, a finding confirming the
long-standing belief that metacognition and self-concept constitute distinct psychological
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constructs. In contrast, when the relationship is considered via the confidence within both con-
structs or via the accuracy of this confidence, metacognitive monitoring and self-concept show
a clear overlap, indicating a common feature of (over-optimistic) self-evaluations. More pre-
cisely, comparing the absolute level of confidence in confidence judgments and self-concept
revealed a small, yet significant relation between the constructs, whereas comparing the biases
in confidence judgments and self-concept revealed an even stronger association. Thus, the
common processes of metacognition and self-concept seem to be best addressed by relying on
a score reflecting the absolute accuracy of an individual’s self-evaluations.
Regarding the results of detecting a positive relationship between monitoring and self-con-
cept at the absolute level of confidence ratings, yet failing to determine any relationship when
accounting for performance in confidence judgments, the present findings are in line with pre-
vious research [4,36]. The positive association at the level of absolute ratings suggests an
underlying, trait-like disposition of individuals to appraise their own cognitive work in a spe-
cific and constant way. Thus, this finding is in agreement with studies describing a general
confidence trait [19,23,24,27–29], which has been shown to be weakly related to the broader
construct of self-evaluation, namely the self-concept [32]. Notably, the current study indicates
an early presence of such a general disposition of individuals towards a constant level of self-
appraisal and supports the assumption of self-concept being related to a more general self-con-
fidence trait already in young children.
Since previous research failed to unveil a common thread between metacognition and self-
concept once controlling for monitoring performance, up to date, empirical evidence in favor
of a common thread was limited to findings based on measures of absolute levels of confi-
dence, that is, measures of self-evaluation that leave the subjects’ performance aside. There are,
however, several reasons for why ignoring performance may not be plausible. For one, it is
well known that confidence judgments and self-concept are related to performance, a finding
also confirmed in children [17,50]. Furthermore, the realism of one’s self-evaluation remains
to be an important research topic in both fields of study, and calibration is of particular interest
in metacognition research. And finally, it should be kept in mind that historically, the general
confidence trait literally was explored to explain individual differences in over confidence, that
is, the deviation between subjective self-evaluation and objective performance. Thus, in search
of a common thread regarding metacognition and self-concept, the consideration of perfor-
mance is inevitable.
In the present study, we extended on previous research by accounting for performance not
only with respect to the confidence judgments but also to the self-concept. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first in explicitly “calibrating” the self-concept, that is, providing a mea-
sure of discrepancy between self-concept ratings and performance. Hence, having at our dis-
posal a bias score for confidence judgments as well as for self-concept allowed us to compare
the constructs on a new and so far unexplored level. In doing so, we could unveil an even
stronger link between monitoring and self-concept than by simply relying on absolute levels of
confidence. Thus, while monitoring and self-concept indeed share a child’s tendency towards
a certain level of self-appraisal, the “true” common thread may rather lie in the ability to realis-
tically appraise and evaluate one’s own cognitive performance.
Limitations and implications
There are some caveats to be considered when interpreting the results. For one, the bias score
was significantly more pronounced in self-concept than in monitoring, a finding that may pri-
marily be due to the high mean accuracy in the Kanji task. Since a correct item recognition
can only be followed by a realistic or underconfident confidence judgment, the bias in
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monitoring suffered from a ceiling effect. Moreover, the bias in monitoring was computed
based on a larger number of ratings than the bias in self-concept (i.e., 16 items and 6 items,
respectively), increasing the probability of a counterbalanced mean bias being closer to zero.
Lastly, the two biases were obtained by self-reports measured with different scales, that is, a
5-point smiley scale for the confidence judgments and a 25-point stickman scale for self-con-
cept, whereby the self-concept scale used a relative response format. Accordingly, future stud-
ies need to carefully select measurement instruments suitable for countering the mentioned
threats. By applying tests resulting in an equally pronounced bias, the link between monitoring
and self-concept might be found to be even larger than in the present study.
Further on, it is noteworthy that confidence in monitoring was assessed only with a single
task, i.e., the Kanji task. Still, the applied Kanji task can be said to assess children’s cognitive
ability on a general level, since it is neither a genuine verbal nor mathematical task. Neverthe-
less, future studies should account for various sources of confidence judgments to generalize
our findings to self-confidence as understood by the broad, general confidence trait. Similarly,
we acknowledge that mathematical and verbal self-concept are merely two potential facets of
self-concept. While, conceptually, academic self-concept constitutes the most closely related
construct, self-appraisals resulting from other self-concept domains may be related to a general
confidence trait as well. Thus, an interesting area for future research could be to examine the
relation between metacognition and self-concept by adopting a broader perspective on self-
concept.
Lastly, the present findings might not be generalizable to the adult population. Investigating
and comparing constructs that are based on individuals’ self-evaluation in participants as
young as in the present study can be challenging, since children’s ability to introspect and tak-
ing themselves as objects of cognitive processing is still in development [16,17,53]. Typically,
young children are highly overconfident when evaluating themselves. Thus, the pronounced
similarity between monitoring and self-concept when relying on the respective biases, might—
at least in part—also be interpreted as mirroring the generally positively biased self-perception
of young children [51]. Hence, future research should replicate the disclosed construct relation
in adults via multiple measures to corroborate the persistence of the relationship over the
course of life.
In sum, the present study opens up new research directions to compare various constructs
dealing with an individuals’ self-perception, while more research is needed to confirm and
understand the common thread between metacognition and self-concept. Future studies fol-
lowing the presented domain-unifying design would be worthwhile to the broader goal of
understanding individual patterns of self-evaluation as well as its development. Finally, future
directions might also extend this approach by considering additional psychological constructs
related to an individuals’ self-evaluation and cognitive performance.
Conclusion
In exploring the common thread between metacognition and self-concept, the current study
extends the existing research by identifying and comparing a comprehensive set of construct
relating measures in elementary school children. Results indicate that it is by and large due to
the selected measures whether a substantiated, evidence-based relation between metacognitive
monitoring and self-concept can be identified or not; while analyses based on scores well
established in the respective research area may result in merely weak, nonsignificant correla-
tions between monitoring and self-concept, analyses adopting a domain-unifying perspective
shall unveil a clear overlap of the constructs. The present study suggests that the confluence of
self-evaluations from metacognition and self-concept most likely manifests itself when
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children’s ability to accurately evaluate themselves is concerned. Accordingly, we conclude
that the “true” common thread between metacognition and self-concept may best be charac-
terized by an individual’s bias towards overconfidence, hence, the ability for accurate self-
evaluations.
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